• DocumentCode
    126156
  • Title

    Analysis of EM emission from cryptographic devices

  • Author

    Sone, Hidekazu ; Hayashi, Yu-ichi ; Mizuki, Takaaki

  • Author_Institution
    Cyberscience Center, Tohoku Univ., Sendai, Japan
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    16-23 Aug. 2014
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    Electromagnetic information leakage is an attack against secret information in an information-processing circuit, and realized by observing electromagnetic radiation around the circuit. When a cryptographic module works, electrical fluctuation in it can be conducted to peripheral circuits by ground bounce, resulting in electromagnetic radiation. The authors demonstrate the mechanism through experiments with an FPGA board which processes the standard cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). Measurement of electromagnetic radiation from a power cable showed that correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) reveals the secret keys. The leakage is possible even if voltage regulators are placed as a disturbing factor between the module and the measurement points. Circuit-level countermeasures against CEMA are also discussed, and an information suppression technique is proposed by the authors.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; electromagnetic compatibility; field programmable gate arrays; CEMA; EM emission analysis; FPGA board; advanced encryption standard; circuit-level countermeasures; correlation electromagnetic analysis; cryptographic devices; cryptographic module; electrical fluctuation; electromagnetic information leakage; electromagnetic radiation; ground bounce; information suppression technique; information-processing circuit; measurement points; peripheral circuits; power cable; secret information; standard cipher AES; voltage regulators; Correlation; Cryptography; Current measurement; Electromagnetic compatibility; Power cables; Standards; Transient analysis;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    General Assembly and Scientific Symposium (URSI GASS), 2014 XXXIth URSI
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/URSIGASS.2014.6929521
  • Filename
    6929521