DocumentCode
149982
Title
Incentive mechanism for participatory sensing under budget constraints
Author
Zheng Song ; Ngai, Edith ; Jian Ma ; Xiangyang Gong ; Yazhi Liu ; Wendong Wang
Author_Institution
State Key Lab. of Networking & Switching Technol., Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China
fYear
2014
fDate
6-9 April 2014
Firstpage
3361
Lastpage
3366
Abstract
Incentive strategy is important in participatory sensing, especially when the budget is limited, to decide how much and where the samples should be collected. Current auction-based incentive strategies purchase sensing data with lowest price requirements to maximize the amount of samples. However, such methods may lead to inaccurate sensing result after data interpolation, particularly for participants that are massing in certain subregions where the low-price sensing data are usually aggregated. In this paper, we introduce weighted entropy as a quantitative metric to evaluate the distribution of samples and find that the distribution of data samples is another important factor to the accuracy of sensing result. We further propose a greedy-based incentive strategy which considers both the amount and distribution of samples in data collection. Simulations with real datasets confirmed the impact of samples distribution to data accuracy and demonstrated the efficacy of our proposed incentive strategy.
Keywords
entropy; mobile computing; sensor fusion; wireless sensor networks; budget constraints; data sample distribution; incentive mechanism; participatory sensing; quantitative metric; weighted entropy; Accuracy; Entropy; Interpolation; Measurement; Resource management; Sensors; Servers;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2014 IEEE
Conference_Location
Istanbul
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/WCNC.2014.6953116
Filename
6953116
Link To Document