Notice of RetractionGovernment regulations, institutional choices, and market effects — Take China´s compulsory certification system as an example

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

The Sanlu milk powder scandal occurred in China in 2008 aroused great international attention to China´s quality certification system. This paper studies the current China´s quality certification system and points out the fact that the regulatory role played by the Chinese government is practically a monopolized function to “certification” supply. This paper takes China´s compulsory product certification as an example and adopts market concentration index CRn and H index to verify this sort of monopolization. The validity of certain compulsory product certification is also verified by random inspection of their acceptability. The results of this study indicate that there is a negative market effect with the current China´s quality certification system, which results in higher rate of acceptability of non-compulsory certified products than the compulsory certified products.