Tags and their reputation in demographic Donor-Recipient game

We consider the effect of tags and their reputation on the emergence of cooperation in demographic Donor-Recipient game. Players are initially randomly distributed in square lattice of cells. In each period, players move locally to random cell in neighbors or globally to random unoccupied cell in the whole lattice, and play multiple games against local neighbors or against randomly selected global players. If his wealth (accumulated payoff) becomes greater than some amount and there is unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. In Donor-Recipient game, one player is selected as Donor and the other as Recipient randomly. Donor has two moves Cooperate or Defect; Cooperate means Donor pays cost for Recipient to receive benefit. Defect means Donor does nothing. In this paper, we introduce tags and communication about tags. A player can be distinguished by his inheriting tag. Donor decides his move depending on Recipient´s tag. Before a Donor´s move a Recipient can communicate his experienced objective information to the Donor. This information indicates which tags are cooperative. Donor holds this information from Recipients as hearsay reputation about tags and uses the reputation to adjust his strategy. We show, by Agent-Based Simulation, that introducing tags promotes the emergence of cooperation. Tags´ reputation promotes the emergence of cooperation as well, if the number of different tags is small.