Study on Chain Model of Evolutionary Game of Industrial Cluster under Strong Correlation between Individual Pay-off and Individual Quantity

Author

Ruan, Aiqing ; Liu, Sifeng ; Fang, ZhiGeng ; Hu, Yong ; Hu, Mingli

Author_Institution

Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Nanjing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut.

Volume

1

fYear

0

fDate

0-0 0

Firstpage

3648

Lastpage

3652

Abstract

A new chain model of evolutionary game is proposed for studying the process of industrial agglomeration. It is capable of describing some real life conditions when pay-off of individual is not fixed and varies with the process of evolutionary. Different from the classical evolutionary game, in which pay-off matrix is changeless during evolutionary process, this paper discusses the chain model of evolutionary game, in which individual pay-off is strongly correlated with quantity of individual. On the basis of these, we imitate and analyze its replication dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The imitation showed that, due to the interrelation of individual income and individual quantity, the process and the evolutionary stable strategy of this type of evolution game present diversity

Keywords

evolutionary computation; game theory; industrial economics; chain model; evolutionary game; evolutionary process; evolutionary stable strategy; individual income; individual pay-off; individual quantity; industrial agglomeration; industrial cluster; pay-off matrix; replication dynamics; Aerodynamics; Costs; Educational programs; Electronic switching systems; Environmental factors; Game theory; Industrial relations; Production facilities; Technological innovation; Toy industry; chain model; evolutionary game; industry agglomeration;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Intelligent Control and Automation, 2006. WCICA 2006. The Sixth World Congress on

Conference_Location

Dalian

Print_ISBN

1-4244-0332-4

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/WCICA.2006.1713050

Filename

1713050