DocumentCode
176697
Title
Convergence of potential networked evolutionary games
Author
Yuanhua Wang ; Ting Liu ; Daizhan Cheng
Author_Institution
Inst. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China
fYear
2014
fDate
May 31 2014-June 2 2014
Firstpage
3749
Lastpage
3754
Abstract
This paper considers when a potential networked evolutionary game (NEG) converges to a Nash equilibrium. First, based on the fundamental evolutionary equation, the profile dynamics of an NEG is revealed. Then we show that an NEG is potential, if the fundamental network game is. Finally, a sufficient condition for an NEG to converge to a Nash equilibrium is presented. An illustrative example is included to demonstrate the theoretical and numerical results.
Keywords
convergence; evolutionary computation; game theory; network theory (graphs); NEG; Nash equilibrium; convergence; fundamental evolutionary equation; potential networked evolutionary games; Biology; Electronic mail; Games; Mathematical model; Nash equilibrium; Power system dynamics; Power system stability; Nash equilibrium; Networked evolutionary game; myopic best response adjustment rule (MBRAR); potential; semi-tensor product of matrices;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Control and Decision Conference (2014 CCDC), The 26th Chinese
Conference_Location
Changsha
Print_ISBN
978-1-4799-3707-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CCDC.2014.6852832
Filename
6852832
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