DocumentCode
1848826
Title
Notice of Retraction
A Survey study on the use of non-financial performance measures in the scheme of divisional managers´ incentive contracts
Author
Wang Hua-bing
Author_Institution
Accounting Dept., City Coll. of Wenzhou Univ., Wenzhou, China
Volume
2
fYear
2011
fDate
13-15 May 2011
Firstpage
456
Lastpage
459
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper discusses factors in determining the weights of performance measures in divisional managers´ contract design through questionnaire survey method. The results shows that the higher the degree between divisional strategy synergy, the higher the weight of non-financial performance measures in divisional managers´ incentive contracts, and the more private information the divisional manager has about the divisions and the bigger the divisional managers´ action on divisional short-term financial performance, the lower the weight of non-financial performance measures in divisional managers´ incentive contracts. This paper not only provides the corresponding empirical evidence on the existing theoretical research about performance measures, but also provides certain enlightenment for division manager´s contract design.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper discusses factors in determining the weights of performance measures in divisional managers´ contract design through questionnaire survey method. The results shows that the higher the degree between divisional strategy synergy, the higher the weight of non-financial performance measures in divisional managers´ incentive contracts, and the more private information the divisional manager has about the divisions and the bigger the divisional managers´ action on divisional short-term financial performance, the lower the weight of non-financial performance measures in divisional managers´ incentive contracts. This paper not only provides the corresponding empirical evidence on the existing theoretical research about performance measures, but also provides certain enlightenment for division manager´s contract design.
Keywords
contracts; incentive schemes; divisional manager; divisional strategy synergy; incentive contracts; nonfinancial performance measure; Companies; Contracts; Industries; Performance evaluation; Robustness; Size measurement; Weight measurement; contact scheme; divisional manager; non-financial performance measures;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business Management and Electronic Information (BMEI), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-1-61284-108-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICBMEI.2011.5917945
Filename
5917945
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