DocumentCode :
1861560
Title :
Dynamics of electricity market with bounded rationality Cournot game considering transmission constraints
Author :
Yang, Hongming ; Liu, Zhengjun ; Lai, Mingyong
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Electr. & Inf. Eng., Changsha Univ. of Technol., Hunan
fYear :
2005
fDate :
Nov. 29 2005-Dec. 2 2005
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
455
Abstract :
In order to accurately model the game behaviors of market participants with bounded rationality in electricity market environment, this paper proposes the dynamic Cournot game model with bounded rationality considering transmission constraints. With this model, the Nash equilibrium and its stability of duopoly game are qualitatively analyzed, indicating that in electricity market there are different Nash equilibriums in different market parameters and operational conditions of transmission network, i.e., congestion and non-congestion, and even in some cases there is not Nash equilibrium at all. Then, the effect of some market parameters is discussed on the stability of electricity market. Based on the duopoly game model, the market dynamic behaviors are numerically simulated, in which the periodic or chaotic behaviors are focused when the market parameters are out of the stability region of Nash equilibrium
Keywords :
game theory; power markets; transmission networks; Nash equilibrium; bounded rationality Cournot game; duopoly game; dynamic market behavior; electricity market; transmission constraints; transmission networks; Chaos; Differential equations; Educational institutions; Electricity supply industry; Energy consumption; Information analysis; Nash equilibrium; Numerical simulation; Stability analysis; Supply and demand; Bounded rationality; Cournot game; Nash equilibrium; chaotic behavior; electricity market; stability;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Power Engineering Conference, 2005. IPEC 2005. The 7th International
Conference_Location :
Singapore
Print_ISBN :
981-05-5702-7
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/IPEC.2005.206951
Filename :
1627240
Link To Document :
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