Title :
Perverse incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: The case of Hangzhou subway collapse
Author :
Yongchi, Ma ; De Jong, Martin ; Koppenjan, Joop ; Bao, Xi
Author_Institution :
Harbin Inst. of Technol., Harbin, China
Abstract :
Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety performance of subway construction.
Keywords :
business continuity; construction industry; contracts; railway industry; railway safety; Hangzhou subway collapse; contractual arrangement; invisible tradeoffs; perverse incentives; principal agent; safety performance; serious subway construction disaster; Accidents; Cities and towns; Contracts; Government; Monitoring; Rail transportation; Safety;
Conference_Titel :
Infrastructure Systems and Services: Next Generation Infrastructure Systems for Eco-Cities (INFRA), 2010 Third International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shenzhen
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8477-5
DOI :
10.1109/INFRA.2010.5679231