Title :
Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles
Forward energy contracts for electricity markets under market power and network uncertainty
Author :
Farahani, V. Zamani ; Jadid, Sh. ; Bidhendi, H. Mohammadi
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., Iran Univ. of Technol. & Technol., Tehran
Abstract :
Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles
"Forward Energy Contracts for Electricity Markets under Market Power and Network Uncertainty,"
by V. Zamani Farahani, Sh. Jadid, H. Mohammadi Bidhendi,
in the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Power India Conference
After careful and considered review of the content and authorship of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE\´s Publication Principles.
This paper contains significant portions of original text from the paper cited below. The original text was copied without attribution (including appropriate references to the original author(s) and/or paper title) and without permission.
Due to the nature of this violation, reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper, and future references should be made to the following article:
"Two Settlement Systems for Electricity Markets under Network Uncertainty and Market Power"
by Rajnish Kamat and Shmuel S. Oren,
in the Journal of Regulatory Economics, 25:1 Kluwer, 2004, pp. 5-37
The restructuring of the electric power industry has involved paradigm makes new structures in power markets. There are two major market structures in restructured power markets. Two-settlement is a new market structure with two period of competition. The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which a two-settlement system facilitates forward trading, as well as the welfare and distributional implications of such a system in the presence of network uncertainty and generator market power. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which a random capacity congestion of an important transmission line is modeled. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion, forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets, may be nullified to a great extent
Keywords :
game theory; power markets; power transmission economics; Nash equilibrium; decentralized market; duopoly model; electric power industry; electricity market; forward energy contract; game theory; network uncertainty; probability; random congestion; restructured power market; transmission line;
Conference_Titel :
Power India Conference, 2006 IEEE
Conference_Location :
New Delhi
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-9525-5
DOI :
10.1109/POWERI.2006.1632537
