A Selfish Game-Theoretic Approach for Cognitive Radio Networks with Dynamic Spectrum Sharing

To meet the dynamic spectrum access of cognitive radio (CR), the selfish game-theoretic model is identified for multi-hop networking with CR nodes, which matches well with the physical administrative structure in real-life situations. This paper investigates user communication session via a cross-layer optimization approach, with joint consideration of power control, scheduling, and routing. Both the channel quality and the spectrum substitutability are discussed. A utility function is built, for the secondary user to obtain the spectrum demand function. Also, in terms of spectrum access opportunities, an equilibrium pricing scheme is presented to show that it is close to optimal in most scenarios. The proposed game-theoretic CR spectrum sharing algorithm (GCSS) highlights the trend of spectrum pricing design that it is not necessarily bad for the network users to behave selfishly. Experimental and simulation results are provided as verification of the analyses and solutions.