• DocumentCode
    1985454
  • Title

    Sealed First-price Auction pricing approach in the application of stumpage markets

  • Author

    Jiangang, Zhang ; Bo, Zhu ; Yingli, Huang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., North-east Forestry Univ., Harbin, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    17-18 July 2010
  • Firstpage
    886
  • Lastpage
    889
  • Abstract
    At first, this paper shows the situation of the stumpage transactions in China, and according to the characteristics of the stumpage products and a variety of auctions, it uses the theory of the Sealed First-price Auction to show the structure of stumpage markets and the game analysis of two Bidders. Secondly, this paper establishes the auction pricing model to analyze the bidders´ strategies, uses Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium in stumpage market transactions to price the stumpage products, and endues the sale price of the deal applying Sealed First-price Auction theory. Finally it has solved the problem that the current pricing methods are not suitable in the process of stumpage product on the move.
  • Keywords
    commerce; pricing; Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; China; game analysis; sealed first-price auction pricing; stumpage markets; Educational institutions; Sealed First-price Auction(FPSB); game and equilibrium analysis; pricing approach; stumpage transactions;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Environmental Science and Information Application Technology (ESIAT), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7387-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ESIAT.2010.5567203
  • Filename
    5567203