DocumentCode
1985454
Title
Sealed First-price Auction pricing approach in the application of stumpage markets
Author
Jiangang, Zhang ; Bo, Zhu ; Yingli, Huang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., North-east Forestry Univ., Harbin, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
17-18 July 2010
Firstpage
886
Lastpage
889
Abstract
At first, this paper shows the situation of the stumpage transactions in China, and according to the characteristics of the stumpage products and a variety of auctions, it uses the theory of the Sealed First-price Auction to show the structure of stumpage markets and the game analysis of two Bidders. Secondly, this paper establishes the auction pricing model to analyze the bidders´ strategies, uses Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium in stumpage market transactions to price the stumpage products, and endues the sale price of the deal applying Sealed First-price Auction theory. Finally it has solved the problem that the current pricing methods are not suitable in the process of stumpage product on the move.
Keywords
commerce; pricing; Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; China; game analysis; sealed first-price auction pricing; stumpage markets; Educational institutions; Sealed First-price Auction(FPSB); game and equilibrium analysis; pricing approach; stumpage transactions;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Environmental Science and Information Application Technology (ESIAT), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7387-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ESIAT.2010.5567203
Filename
5567203
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