A DPA/DEMA/LEMA-resistant AES cryptographic processor with supply-current equalizer and micro EM probe sensor

Author

Fujimoto, Daisuke ; Miura, Noriyuki ; Hayashi, Yu-ichi ; Homma, Naofumi ; Aoki, Takafumi ; Nagata, Makoto

Author_Institution

Kobe Univ., Kobe, Japan

fYear

2015

fDate

19-22 Jan. 2015

Firstpage

26

Lastpage

27

Abstract

Combination of a supply-current equalizer (EQ) and a micro EM probe sensor (EMS) exhibits strong resiliency against major three DPA/DEMA/LEMA low-cost side-channel attacks on a cryptographic processor. Test-chip measurements with 128bit AES cryptographic processor in 0.18μm CMOS successfully demonstrate the secret key protection from all three attacks. A digital-oriented circuit implementation together with a careful design optimization minimize the hardware overhead of EQ and EMS to +33%, +1.6% in area, +7.6%, +0.15% in power, and ~0%, -0.2% in performance of an unprotected AES, respectively.

Keywords

CMOS integrated circuits; equalisers; microprocessor chips; optimisation; power aware computing; private key cryptography; 0.18μm CMOS; 128bit AES cryptographic processor; DPA-DEMA-LEMA-resistant AES cryptographic processor; EMS; EQ; design optimization; digital-oriented circuit implementation; hardware overhead; low-cost side-channel attacks; microEM probe sensor; secret key protection; supply-current equalizer; test-chip measurements; CMOS integrated circuits; Calibration; Cryptography; Equalizers; Hardware; Probes; Semiconductor device measurement;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), 2015 20th Asia and South Pacific

Conference_Location

Chiba

Print_ISBN

978-1-4799-7790-1

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ASPDAC.2015.7058929

Filename

7058929