Modeling and Verifying the Ariadne Protocol Using CSP

Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are formed dynamically by mobile nodes without the support of prior stationary infrastructures. In such networks, routing protocols, particularly secure ones are always an essential part. Ariadne, an efficient and well-known on-demand secure protocol of MANETs, mainly concerns about how to prevent a malicious node from compromising the route. In this paper, we apply the method of process algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to model and reason about the Ariadne protocol, focusing on the process of its route discovery. In our framework, we consider the communication entities as processes, including the initiator, the intermediate nodes and the target. Moreover, we use PAT, a model checker for CSP, to verify whether the model caters for the specification and the non-trivial secure properties, e.g. existence of fake path. Our verification result naturally demonstrates that the fake routing attacks may be present in the Ariadne protocol.