DocumentCode
2040709
Title
Game theory and pragmatics: An evolutionary approach
Author
Nori, Ryousuke ; Kawagoe, Toshiji
Author_Institution
Grad. Sch. of Syst. Inf. Sci., Future Univ. Hakodate, Hakodate, Japan
fYear
2011
fDate
13-18 Sept. 2011
Firstpage
1196
Lastpage
1201
Abstract
In this paper, Parikh´s model of ambiguous utterances is extended by changing the degree of coincidence of interest between sender and receiver, and is analyzed by evolutionary game theory. We found that ambiguous utterances can be a stable outcome with certain condition. Agent-based simulation also confirmed this finding.
Keywords
computational linguistics; evolutionary computation; game theory; Parikh model; agent-based simulation; ambiguous utterance; evolutionary approach; evolutionary game theory; pragmatics; Bayesian methods; Games; Mathematical model; Nash equilibrium; Pragmatics; Receivers; Pragmatics; agent-based simulation; evolution; game theory;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
SICE Annual Conference (SICE), 2011 Proceedings of
Conference_Location
Tokyo
ISSN
pending
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0714-8
Type
conf
Filename
6060515
Link To Document