DocumentCode :
2119282
Title :
Supply Chain Coordination Based on the Information Asymmetry and Virtual Third Party
Author :
Cheng, Hong ; Guo, Hongmei ; Wang, Xianyu
Author_Institution :
Bus. Sch., Sichuan Univ., Chengdu, China
fYear :
2010
fDate :
24-26 Dec. 2010
Firstpage :
179
Lastpage :
183
Abstract :
Information asymmetry widely exists in the supply chain. The supply chain cannot be coordinated easily because of it. But coordination is important to maximize the profit of supply chain. In this paper, the situation that supplier has adverse selection and the retailer has moral hazard for information asymmetry is considered. A virtual third party is introduced to develop an incentive model from the perspective of supply chain. The result shows that this method can coordinate the supply chain under information asymmetry. And the model is proved to be the same as that in real world.
Keywords :
incentive schemes; outsourcing; profitability; supply chain management; incentive model; information asymmetry; profit maximisation; retailer; supply chain coordination; virtual third party; Contracts; Distribution functions; Ethics; Europe; Hazards; Mathematical model; Supply chains; adverse selection; information asymmetry; moral hazard; supply chain coordination; virtual third party;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Science and Engineering (ISISE), 2010 International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai
ISSN :
2160-1283
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-428-2
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISISE.2010.83
Filename :
5945080
Link To Document :
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