Game analysis of compatible decisions between open source and proprietary software

By extending Hotelling game model, this paper explores compatible strategies between open source software (OSS) and proprietary software (PS). In this paper, we assume that PS producer aims at profit maximization, OSS producer pursues market share maximization and software user´s expectations on network size may be fulfilled or myopic. For each type of user expectation, we study both cases of market fully covered and partly covered. The main findings are following: (i) in the case of myopic expectation, both OSS and PS producers choose maximum compatible degree in equilibrium. This conclusion is true in both fully covered and partly covered markets; (ii) in the case of fulfilled expectation, equilibrium compatible strategies depend on market coverage. When the market is partly covered, both OSS and PS producers choose maximum compatible degree in equilibrium. But when the market is fully covered, PS producer may choose maximum compatible degree or incompatibility as its equilibrium strategy (The choice depends on the learning (maintenance or development) cost of OSS, user´s software development capacity and network externality); (iii) how the competitive strategies of OSS and PS producers are affected by the rival´s compatible degree may be different in different user expectations (or market coverage).