DocumentCode :
2155563
Title :
A practical mechanism for network utility maximization for unicast flows on the internet
Author :
Sinha, Abhinav ; Anastasopoulos, Achilleas
Author_Institution :
EECS Department, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 48109, USA
fYear :
2015
fDate :
8-12 June 2015
Firstpage :
5679
Lastpage :
5684
Abstract :
In this paper we consider the scenario of unicast service on the Internet where a network operator wishes to allocate rates among strategic users in a way that maximizes overall user satisfaction while respecting capacity constraints on every link in the network. In particular, we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social welfare maximizing allocation in Nash equilibria (NE) for the above scenario when agents´ utilities are their private information. The emphasis of this work is on full implementation, which means that all NE of the induced game result in the optimal allocation of the centralized allocation problem, and thus no extraneous/ unwanted equilibria are created, as is the case in general mechanism design. The constructed mechanisms are amenable to learning, an essential requirement when using NE as a solution concept. This is achieved by ensuring that they result in feasible allocations on and off equilibrium and are budget balanced.
Keywords :
Cost accounting; Finance; Games; Internet; Next generation networking; Resource management; Unicast;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Communications (ICC), 2015 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
London, United Kingdom
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICC.2015.7249227
Filename :
7249227
Link To Document :
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