DocumentCode :
2211821
Title :
Research on the Principal-Agent Model of Enterprise Human Resource Management Outsourcing
Author :
Lv, Qing ; Huang, Shixiang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Trade, Anhui Agric. Univ., Hefei, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
26-28 Dec. 2009
Firstpage :
4476
Lastpage :
4479
Abstract :
With the increasingly furious market competition, human resource has been the core resource for enterprises to gain sustained competitive strength. As a new management method, human resource management outsourcing gradually shows its necessity and essentiality. However, in the business of human resource management outsourcing, it is a combination of outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing vendors with different interest. There is a great uncertainty between their complex relationship and the environment of internal and external. In such Information asymmetry case, it is the focus of the research that how outsourcing enterprises take incentive measures to achieve the win-win target. This article, from the view of moral hazard model based on the Principal-agent theory, is attempted to discuss model solution in different situations. Finally, according to the conclusions, this article points out some reasonable and effective suggestions.
Keywords :
human resource management; outsourcing; competitive strength; enterprise human resource management outsourcing; incentive measure; information asymmetry; market competition; moral hazard model; outsourcing vendor; principal-agent model; win-win target; Agricultural engineering; Contracts; Cost function; Environmental economics; Ethics; Hazards; Human resource management; Information science; Outsourcing; Resource management;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2009 1st International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4909-5
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICISE.2009.1011
Filename :
5454689
Link To Document :
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