DocumentCode :
2221795
Title :
A numerical analysis of the evolutionary iterated snowdrift game
Author :
Greenwood, Garrison W. ; Chopra, Shubham
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Portland State Univ., Portland, OR, USA
fYear :
2011
fDate :
5-8 June 2011
Firstpage :
2010
Lastpage :
2016
Abstract :
The iterated prisoner´s dilemma (IPD) game has been extensively investigated to help researchers gain a better understanding of how cooperation develops in populations. One criticism of IPD is it underestimates the level of cooperation particularly in human populations. The iterated snowdrift (ISD) game has emerged as a viable alternative model, in part because it predicts higher cooperation levels. To date no numerical analysis of ISD has been done. In this paper we report the results from a numerical analysis conducted on an ISD with an N-player, well-mixed population. Our results show, with certain cost-to benefit ratios, evolved ISD strategies can maintain surprisingly high quasi-stable levels of cooperation in the population.
Keywords :
evolutionary computation; game theory; iterative methods; N-player; cost-to benefit ratios; evolutionary iterated snowdrift game; human populations; iterated prisoner dilemma game; numerical analysis; viable alternative model; Cloning; Driver circuits; Games; History; Numerical analysis; Snow; Time series analysis;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Evolutionary Computation (CEC), 2011 IEEE Congress on
Conference_Location :
New Orleans, LA
ISSN :
Pending
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7834-7
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CEC.2011.5949862
Filename :
5949862
Link To Document :
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