• DocumentCode
    2317119
  • Title

    How to find Nash equilibria with extreme total latency in network congestion games?

  • Author

    Sperber, Heike

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Math., Univ. of Kaiserslautern, Kaiserslautern, Germany
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    13-15 May 2009
  • Firstpage
    158
  • Lastpage
    163
  • Abstract
    We study the complexity of finding extreme pure Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games and analyse how it depends on the graph topology and the number of users. In our context best and worst equilibria are those with minimum respectively maximum total latency. We establish that both problems can be solved by a Greedy algorithm with a suitable tie breaking rule on parallel links. On series-parallel graphs finding a worst Nash equilibrium is NP-hard for two or more users while finding a best one is solvable in polynomial time for two users and NP-hard for three or more. Additionally we establish NP-hardness in the strong sense for the problem of finding a worst Nash equilibrium on a general acyclic graph.
  • Keywords
    computational complexity; game theory; graph theory; greedy algorithms; minimax techniques; network theory (graphs); NP-hard problem; best equilibria; general acyclic graph; greedy algorithm; maximum total latency; parallel link; polynomial time; series-parallel graph topology; symmetric network congestion game; tie breaking rule; worst Nash equilibria; Adaptive systems; Costs; Degradation; Delay; Game theory; Greedy algorithms; Mathematical model; Nash equilibrium; Network topology; Polynomials; complexity; extreme equilibria; network congestion game; total latency;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Game Theory for Networks, 2009. GameNets '09. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Istanbul
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4176-1
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4177-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137397
  • Filename
    5137397