DocumentCode :
2350326
Title :
AVATAR: A SysML Environment for the Formal Verification of Safety and Security Properties
Author :
Pedroza, Gabriel ; Apvrille, Ludovic ; Knorreck, Daniel
Author_Institution :
Syst.-on-Chip Lab. (LabSoC), Telecom ParisTech, Sophia-Antipolis, France
fYear :
2011
fDate :
9-13 May 2011
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
10
Abstract :
Critical embedded systems - e.g., automotive systems - are now commonly distributed, thus exposing their communication links to attackers. The design of those systems shall therefore handle new security threats whilst maintaining a high level of safety. To address that issue, the paper introduces a SysML-based environment named AVATAR. AVATAR can capture both safety and security related elements in the same SysML model. TTool [1], an open-source UML toolkit, provides AVATAR editing capabilities, and offers a press-button approach for property proof. Indeed, after having modeled an abstract representation of the system and given a description of the safety and security properties, the designer may formally and directly verify those properties with the well established UPPAAL and ProVerif toolkits, respectively. The applicability of our approach is highlighted with a realistic embedded automotive system taken from an ongoing joint project of academia and industry called EVITA [2].
Keywords :
Unified Modeling Language; distributed processing; embedded systems; program verification; security of data; AVATAR; EVITA; ProVerif toolkits; SysML environment; TTool; UPPAAL; abstract representation; critical embedded system; distributed system; embedded automotive system; formal verification; open-source UML toolkit; press-button approach; safety property; security property; security threat; Analytical models; Avatars; Cryptography; Embedded systems; Safety; Unified modeling language;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
New Technologies of Distributed Systems (NOTERE), 2011 11th Annual International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Paris
ISSN :
2162-1896
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0729-2
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/NOTERE.2011.5957992
Filename :
5957992
Link To Document :
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