Title :
The Model Analysis of HR Outsourcing Gambling
Author :
Dai, Wei-Dong ; Du, Sha-Sha
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Shenyang Univ. of Technol. Shenyang, Shenyang, China
Abstract :
The information involved in the process of HR outsourcing is non-symmetrical, it is a certain degree of difficulty that Outsourcing Supplier achieves to maximize the interest in the process of cooperation. Based on principal - agent relationship and in view of outsourcing supplier no understanding the effort level of outsourcing service vendor, setting up the non-continuous effort level outsourcing game model monitored and the continuous effort level outsourcing game model that cannot be monitored. Having done analysis for strategy of cooperation in the light of principal-agent theory framework, Nash Equilibrium thought as well as maximization theory.
Keywords :
artificial intelligence; game theory; outsourcing; HR outsourcing gambling; Nash equilibrium; outsourcing service vendor; outsourcing supplier; principal agent relationship; Biological system modeling; Economics; Humans; Monitoring; Nash equilibrium; Outsourcing; Resource management; HR Outsourcing; Nash Equilibrium; Outsourcing Service Vendor; Outsourcing Supplier;
Conference_Titel :
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3997-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICEE.2010.270