Notice of RetractionThe Incentive Model of Coalmine Safety Manager with Two-layer Principal-agent Relationship

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Aim at the unsafe manager behavior underground the China coalmine accidents taking place frequently recently, the two-layer principal-agent relationship in China coalmine management is analyzed, the double level multi-task incentive model consisting of government, company and coalmine manager is constructed, the coalmine manager´s work behavior under optimal incentive contracts is analyzed and some meaningful conclusions are obtained. It is concluded that: (1) The effort level on safety task of coalmine manager decrease along with the risk level of safety work increasing, but increase along with the coefficient of rewards & punishments setting by government increasing; (2) Government should maximize the coefficient of rewards & punishments under the premise of ensuring company´s participation, in order to urge company and coalmine manager to improve the safety performance.