• DocumentCode
    2421809
  • Title

    Strategic arrivals into queueing networks

  • Author

    Honnappa, Harsha ; Jain, Rahul

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. Eng., Univ. of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    Sept. 29 2010-Oct. 1 2010
  • Firstpage
    820
  • Lastpage
    827
  • Abstract
    Queueing networks are typically analyzed assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations arriving users are strategic, and do time their arrivals taking delay and other metrics into account. This paper builds on, and extends the framework developed to a network setting. We first consider just a single population of users arriving into two queues in parallel (they can join either queue). The queues start serving at different times. We characterize the arrival process into both queues and the Price of Anarchy with strategic arrivals. We then extend this when there are multiple populations, each with different cost metrics. The whole analysis is done in the fluid limit.
  • Keywords
    game theory; queueing theory; telecommunication networks; arrival process; game theory; population games; price of anarchy; queueing network; strategic arrival; Approximation methods; Cost function; Delay; Games; Queueing analysis; Servers; Game theory; Population games; Queueing Networks; Strategic arrivals;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Allerton, IL
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8215-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5706993
  • Filename
    5706993