Title :
Study on the morale of information sharing of supply chain based on the entrusted agency theory
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China
Abstract :
Supply chain information sharing can be achieved by a reimbursable information sharing mechanisms. Through using the theory of entrusted agency and a single-task entrusted agency, the paper studies the problem about supply chain information sharing between manufacturers and sellers. The level effecting two sides can be described by a linear relation and income relations, as well as the morale of the contract can be analyzed under symmetrical and asymmetrical information circumstances. Consequently, the enterprises know the values of information sharing clearly, at the same time, the cost of supply chain management can be reduced and the efficiency of the supply chain management can be improved.
Keywords :
contracts; information management; supply chain management; asymmetrical information; contract; income relations; linear relation; reimbursable information sharing mechanisms; single-task entrusted agency theory; supply chain information sharing; supply chain management; symmetrical information; Contracts; Marketing and sales; Monitoring; Supply chain management; Supply chains; Uncertainty; incentive mechanism; information sharing; supply chain; the theory of entrusted agency;
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Industrial Engineering (MSIE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Harbin
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8383-9
DOI :
10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707557