Title :
Nash Equilibria of 2-Player Finite Simultaneous Move Games
Author :
Chen, Qianqin ; Ou, Ruiqiu ; Yang, Jianmei
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Commerce, South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou, China
Abstract :
By the theory of measure and linear algebra, this paper shows that the following property holds for almost all 2-player finite simultaneous games: for any Nash equilibrium, the numbers of pure strategies assigned positive probability by two players are equal. Moreover, if all the equilibria of the game are quasi-strong, the number of equilibria of the game is finite and odd.
Keywords :
game theory; linear algebra; probability; Nash equilibria; linear algebra; oddness theorem; positive probability; quasistrong 2-player finite simultaneous move game; structural symmetry; Artificial intelligence; Business; Game theory; Linear algebra; Nash equilibrium; 2-player finite simultaneous move games; Nash equilibrium; structural symmetry; the oddness theorem;
Conference_Titel :
Artificial Intelligence, 2009. JCAI '09. International Joint Conference on
Conference_Location :
Hainan Island
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3615-6
DOI :
10.1109/JCAI.2009.217
