DocumentCode
2485355
Title
Notice of Retraction
Efficient Analysis of Informative Advertising Strategy in E-Commerce Platforms
Author
Kai Zhang ; Xiang-yang Li
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Inst. of Technol., Harbin, China
fYear
2010
fDate
22-23 May 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
Informative advertising as one of widespread strategies in e-commerce platforms is used for attracting more agents of different sides on board. In this paper, we build a two-stage model to analyze the efficient of informative advertising on equilibrium prices and profit based on two-sided markets theory. In the case of completely covered agent s´ markets, we conclude e-commerce platforms with higher advertising input can not set higher equilibrium entrance prices and get more profits, but they will get bigger market shares. Ironically, the bigger advertising input always profits its rival. Further more, we find that only moderate advertising will improve social welfare, too much or too litter advertising input will decrease social welfare.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
Informative advertising as one of widespread strategies in e-commerce platforms is used for attracting more agents of different sides on board. In this paper, we build a two-stage model to analyze the efficient of informative advertising on equilibrium prices and profit based on two-sided markets theory. In the case of completely covered agent s´ markets, we conclude e-commerce platforms with higher advertising input can not set higher equilibrium entrance prices and get more profits, but they will get bigger market shares. Ironically, the bigger advertising input always profits its rival. Further more, we find that only moderate advertising will improve social welfare, too much or too litter advertising input will decrease social welfare.
Keywords
advertising; electronic commerce; industrial economics; e-commerce platforms; equilibrium prices; informative advertising strategy; social welfare; two sided markets theory; Advertising; Certification; Cost function; Defense industry; Electronic commerce; Eyes; Pricing; TV; Technology management; Weapons;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
e-Business and Information System Security (EBISS), 2010 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5893-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/EBISS.2010.5473613
Filename
5473613
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