DocumentCode
2556580
Title
Research on incentive strategy for optimal provisioning and dynamic pricing control of monopoly networks
Author
Yue, Xiaoning ; Jing, Yuanwei ; Xu, Baoshu
Author_Institution
Coll. of Sci., Shenyang Univ., Shenyang
fYear
2008
fDate
2-4 July 2008
Firstpage
1181
Lastpage
1185
Abstract
The problems of incentive pricing control on multi-priority monopoly network system have been investigated by introducing the idea of game theory. We have studied the scalable connection management strategy for quality of enabled networks service to make the benefits of the network system and users maximal and given the calculation methods for the optimal provisioning and dynamic pricing of multi-priority networks. The nonlinear and crossing influence on incentive pricing control strategy was given to encourage and guide the users to select the serving request that is helpful to the network system. The users will be amerced in economy when the demand of users deviates the expectation value, and this will help to increase the rate of network resource using. At the same time, the incentive effect on the network system is modulated and controlled by changing the parameters. The results of simulation also demonstrate the incentive pricing control strategies are effective and practical.
Keywords
econometrics; game theory; incentive schemes; monopoly; pricing; dynamic pricing control; expectation value; game theory; incentive pricing control strategy; monopoly networks; multipriority monopoly network system; optimal provisioning; scalable connection management strategy; Control systems; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Game theory; Information science; Monopoly; Optimal control; Pricing; Quality management; Quality of service; Service Level Agreement; connection management; incentive strategy; pricing; provisioning;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Control and Decision Conference, 2008. CCDC 2008. Chinese
Conference_Location
Yantai, Shandong
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-1733-9
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-1734-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597501
Filename
4597501
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