Title :
Analysis of independent director’s behaviour in China’s listed companies based on evolutionary game model
Author :
Fang-yuan Lu ; Feng-you Gao
Author_Institution :
Bus. Sch., Zhengzhou Univ., Zhengzhou
Abstract :
The behaviours of independent directors and managers of Chinapsilas listed companies is analysed based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that only under the condition that the incentive is greater than the cost of supervision for independent directors, such optimal evolutionary stable strategy as independent directors choose ldquosuperviserdquo, enterprise managers choose ldquonot cheatrdquo may exist. The incentive mechanism is not sound, and independent status can not be guaranteed. It may be the main reasons for independent directorspsila nonfeasance in Chinapsilas listed companies.
Keywords :
commerce; evolutionary computation; game theory; incentive schemes; China listed companies; evolutionary game model; evolutionary game theory; incentive mechanism; independent director behaviour; optimal evolutionary stable strategy; Companies; Cost function; Game theory; Evolutionary Stable Strategy; Evolutionary game; Independent Director; Replicator Dynamics;
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference, 2008. CCDC 2008. Chinese
Conference_Location :
Yantai, Shandong
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1733-9
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1734-6
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597512