DocumentCode :
2569636
Title :
Impacts of tradable emission permits on oligopoly electricity market production under complete and incomplete information
Author :
Gao, Hui ; Wen, Fushuan ; MacGill, Iain
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
11-14 Oct. 2009
Firstpage :
3365
Lastpage :
3370
Abstract :
A method is developed to explore the potential links between an oligopolistic electricity market and a competitive emission permit market in which permits allocated to those highly efficient generation companies (units) with lower emissions could be traded to other companies with higher emissions. The well-developed Cournot non-cooperative game model is employed to describe the behavior of power producers, and to determine the market equilibriums of generation outputs under complete and incomplete information. A numerical example with six power producers is employed to demonstrate the features of the developed model as well as to analyze the impacts of emission permit trading on the oligopoly electric market equilibriums.
Keywords :
environmental factors; game theory; oligopoly; power markets; Cournot noncooperative game model; competitive emission permit market; generation companies; market equilibrium; oligopolistic electricity market; tradable emission permits; Cybernetics; Electricity supply industry; Electronic mail; Environmental economics; Game theory; Information analysis; Oligopoly; Power generation; Production; USA Councils; Cournot game theory; Electricity market; emissions trading; non-cooperative games; oligopoly;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2009. SMC 2009. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
San Antonio, TX
ISSN :
1062-922X
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2793-2
Electronic_ISBN :
1062-922X
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICSMC.2009.5346193
Filename :
5346193
Link To Document :
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