• DocumentCode
    2575433
  • Title

    Provably Secure Identity-Based Aggregate Signature Scheme

  • Author

    Kar, Jajnyaseni

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Inf. Syst., King Abdulaziz Univ., Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    10-12 Oct. 2012
  • Firstpage
    137
  • Lastpage
    142
  • Abstract
    This paper proposes an efficient and secure identity based online and off-line aggregate signature scheme with random oracles. An aggregate signature privides a technique for combining n differents signatures of n different messages into one signature of constant length. The proposed scheme can be implimentated on Wireless Sensor Networks application. Security of the proposed scheme is based on difficulty of breaking Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP). The scheme is secure in random oracle models under the assumption of computational infeasibility of solving BDHP. It is existential unforgerable under adaptive-chosen-identity and adaptive-chosen-message attack In On-line/Off-line signature scheme, the signing process can be broken into two phases. The first phase, performed off-line, is independent of the particular message to be signed, while the second phase is performed on-line, once the message is presented.
  • Keywords
    digital signatures; public key cryptography; wireless sensor networks; BDHP; adaptive-chosen-identity attack; adaptive-chosen-message attack; bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem; identity-based aggregate signature scheme security; offline aggregate signature scheme; online aggregate signature scheme; random oracle models; wireless sensor network application; Aggregates; Computational modeling; Forgery; Generators; Polynomials; Security; Wireless sensor networks; BDHP; Bilinear Pairing; aggregate signature; online/offline;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC), 2012 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Sanya
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-2624-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CyberC.2012.30
  • Filename
    6384957