Power analysis attack on hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Author

Pei Luo ; Yunsi Fei ; Xin Fang ; Ding, A. Adam ; Leeser, Miriam ; Kaeli, David R.

Author_Institution

Electr. & Comput. Eng. Dept., Northeastern Univ., Boston, MA, USA

fYear

2014

fDate

8-10 Dec. 2014

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

7

Abstract

Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the θ step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.

Keywords

cryptography; field programmable gate arrays; message authentication; FPGA; MAC-Keccak; hardware implementation; hash function; message authentication code; power analysis attack; power-based side-channel attack; side-channel leakage model; Analytical models; Complexity theory; Correlation; Hardware; Registers; Software; Standards;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig), 2014 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Cancun

Print_ISBN

978-1-4799-5943-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ReConFig.2014.7032549

Filename

7032549