Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions, Government Regulations and Market Competition

Cross-border (M&As) have long been a popular strategy for transnational companies (TNCs) and will inevitably influence competitive behaviors and patterns of the host countries´ markets. This paper demonstrates the mechanism and results of these effects by constructing a Nash-Cournot model, with government as a participator in cross-border (M&As). In the model, the factors of government regulation are discussed in the market competition framework on the basis of cross-border (M&As). The basic conclusions this paper drew are: the total output will reduce because of government regulations; enterprises - foreign enterprise (TNCs) and domestically-funded enterprise (host country´s enterprise) will decrease their outputs, but the decrease of the former one will not exceed the latter; foreign investing enterprise can maintain, even increase its output when it involves in the Cournot competition with the domestic investing enterprise for the factor of corporate governance optimization; and different modes of government regulations will lead to different market structures.