Abstract :
This paper considers competition amongst information sources for service from a command centre. Furthermore, many sources may report the same event, causing replication of messages. A models of event reporting distributions, both uncorrelated and correlated are described, with a reward structure associated with service time and a cost structure associated with inter-message times. With message source competition, Nash equilibrium reporting rates are derived. A reward/cost structure may be imposed by the command centre, this is used to admit messages if the source rate is equal to or below that of the Nash equilibrium
Keywords :
command and control systems; game theory; operations research; queueing theory; resource allocation; Nash equilibrium; adaptive weighting; command centre; information sources; message source competition; queueing systems; replication; reward structure; reward/cost structure; Admittance; Bandwidth; Channel allocation; Costs; Exponential distribution; Humans; Information processing; Intelligent networks; Message service; Nash equilibrium;
