Zero-determinant strategy in cheating management of wireless cooperation

Cooperation of resource sharing among wireless users and network operators has been widely studied in wireless communication. However, during the resource sharing, because of the weak communication signals or cheating strategies, each participant of the cooperation may sometimes stop its cooperative behavior unilaterally. Such behavior causes non-cooperation, resulting in unsatisfying quality of services for all participants. In this paper, we model the resource sharing between two participants as an iterated prisoner´s dilemma game. Based on the applications of wireless cooperations, we define the participant who is responsible to maintain the high social welfare as the administrator of cooperation (AoC), and the other rational selfish participant as the regular participant of cooperation (PoC). Then, we propose a zero-determinant strategy for the AoC, and find the maximum social welfare that the AoC can maintain regardless of the strategy of PoC. Simulation results show that when the AoC applies the proposed zero-determinant strategy, the high social welfare can be maintained, and both AoC and PoC receive better performances than those of noncooperation.