Notice of RetractionAn empirical investigation of managerial compensation in publicly listed corporations in China

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Using an unbalanced panel which consists of a total of 43626 executives in 1362 publicly listed corporations (PLCs) in China during 1999 and 2007, this paper empirically examines several theories of managerial compensation. The paper finds that pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks. In addition, pay gap is the largest between the first and second tier executives. Moreover, pay dispersion is positively related to the number of tournament participants, the level of noise in the business environment and firm performance. The empirical results are consistent with the tournament theory and against equity, relative deprivation and sabotage theories.