A Nash Stackelberg approach for network pricing, revenue maximization and vertical handover decision making

Radio resource and mobility managements are becoming more and more complex within nowadays rich and heterogeneous wireless access networking systems. Multiple requirements, challenges and constraints, at both technical and economical perspectives have to be considered. While the main objective remains guaranteeing the best Quality of Service and optimal radio resource utilization, economical aspects have also to be considered including cost minimization for users and revenue maximization for network providers. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic scheme where each available network plays a Stackelberg game with a finite set of users, while users are playing a Nash game among themselves to share the limited radio resources. A Nash equilibrium point is found and used for vertical handover decision making and admission control. We also introduce in the proposed model the user´s requirements in terms of quality of service according to its running application and the network reputation that is conducted from the users´ quality of experience and we study the effect of these parameters on the network pricing and revenue maximization problems.