Mobile communications security-private or public

With the arrival of call traffic encryption and digital mobile networks military-level security could be available to us all. This paper looks at the subject of secure mobile radio communications and the issues that are raised when the right to privacy is tested against the need to know. The issues are illustrated using two major examples. In the European, private approach the original GSM A5 encryption algorithm gives military-standard security to members of the Royal Family and drug barons alike. The export of this encryption mechanism has run into several problems resulting in a confused patchwork of encrypted and open networks around the world. The mechanisms of GSM security are explained and the possible use of those mechanisms for both security and surveillance purposes is illustrated. In the US, public approach the US `clipper´ chip initiative is examined. The FBI has repeatedly attempted to get this project off the ground whereby call encryption equipment in the US is built around a single common chip. The clipper chip produces encryption of voice and data that can only be cracked by a third party who has access to a secure key. The keeper of this key is, of-course, the US government. This article explores the implications of such a system of government-controlled security. It also presents the results of a survey of representatives of some UK companies when asked for their reactions should a similar initiative be launched in this country