DocumentCode :
2914779
Title :
Study on the third-party logistics by symmetric evolutionary game under strong correlation between individual pay-off and evolution stage
Author :
Pang, Xiaoyan ; Tan, Qingmei ; Aiqing, Ruan ; Chunxun, Xie
Author_Institution :
Nanjing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut., Nanjing
fYear :
2007
fDate :
18-20 Nov. 2007
Firstpage :
1250
Lastpage :
1255
Abstract :
One category chain model of evolutionary game is proposed to study the process of some economic conditions. It could be used to describe some real life conditions that the income of some one is in strong correlation with the stage at that time he makes decision, and also condition that decision maker is with bounded rationality and limited knowledge. This paper discusses its evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and some important conclusions are found, that in some situation ESS could be gotten directly, but in another condition ESS could not be worked out and it will be sensitive to initial condition. On the basis of these, this model is used to explain an alliance of Third-Party Logistics(TPL, or 3PL), and a valuable conclusion is gotten and in some situation an alliance of Third-Party Logistics could be created by some ways.
Keywords :
correlation methods; decision making; economics; evolutionary computation; game theory; logistics; chain model; decision making; economic condition; evolutionary stable strategy; individual pay-off; symmetric evolutionary game theory; third-party logistics; Air transportation; Companies; Cultural differences; Electronic switching systems; Game theory; Intelligent systems; Logistics;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Grey Systems and Intelligent Services, 2007. GSIS 2007. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1294-5
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1294-5
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/GSIS.2007.4443473
Filename :
4443473
Link To Document :
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