• DocumentCode
    2958441
  • Title

    Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Innovation in Industrial Clusters

  • Author

    Zhou Min

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Bus. Adm., Guangdong Univ. of Bus. Studies, Guangzhou, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    12-14 Aug. 2011
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    Innovation capability is a critical factor of the survival and continuous development of industrial clusters. The research of innovation mechanism not only plays a guiding role for the competitive advantages and development of industrial clusters, but also has important meaning for sustainable development of regional and even social economy. Cooperative innovation is a major operation form of cluster innovation. Considering the condition of the equality of innovation initiators and cooperators, an evolutionary game model was built based on Replicator Dynamic and the evolutionary process and results of cooperative innovation were analyzed. It was concluded that the deepness of cooperative innovation can be promoted by increasing the sharing private resources paid by initiators and cooperators. Finally the suggestions were indicated for promoting the cooperative innovation of industrial clusters.
  • Keywords
    continuous improvement; evolutionary computation; game theory; innovation management; organisational aspects; sustainable development; continuous development; cooperative innovation; evolutionary game model; industrial clusters innovation capability; regional economy; social economy; sustainable development; Analytical models; Business; Convex functions; Economics; Games; Joints; Technological innovation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6579-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5997905
  • Filename
    5997905