Title :
An Advertising Model of Duopoly with Consumer Searching
Author :
Zhu, Qihong ; Gu, Feng
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Shanghai Lixin Univ. of Shanghai, Shanghai, China
Abstract :
Aiming at the problem that the Tirole(1997)´s analysis of informative advertising ,with the two-phase gaming model applied to it. This paper puts forward the informative advertising model based on consumers´ information searching in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences, and consumers´ costs of information searching can influence the product price and advertising level of enterprises. In the discussion of model equilibrium, the conclusions are: when high discovery cost, in equilibrium, duopoly have the same price and advertising level will increase firstly then decrease if the reservation value increases.
Keywords :
advertising; consumer behaviour; game theory; information retrieval; consumers information search; equilibrium; informative advertising model; product price; two-phase gaming model; Advertising; Analytical models; Diamond-like carbon; Economics; Educational institutions; Production; Search problems;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6579-8
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5998147