Reputation Model in Newsvendor-Type Supply Chain with Long Term Cooperation

With a view to the sustainable development of both supply chain and its members, in this paper, the factor of time is introduced into the principal-agent problem about gaming on moral hazard in newsvendor-type supply chain. Firstly, we define the specific connotation of the reputation of the manufacturer (the principal), and based on which we build the stackelberg game model between the two decision makers in single moral hazard framework on the background of single-period newsvendor problem. We analyze the influence of moral hazard from the manufacturer on the order strategy of the retailer, and testify that the retailer\´s prior judgment on the manufacturer\´s reputation has a positive influence to its order quantity. Thereafter, we extend the game on single period moral hazard to long term cooperation: based on the feature of newsvendor-type supply chain coordination in multi-period game, which refers to "long-term existing multi-period cooperation relationship, constant varying single period game contain", considering the possibility of the retailer\´s misjudging the manufacturer\´s behavior when it makes judgment only according to the actual demand, we build the Manufacturer\´s Reputation Model. This model reveals that the retailer\´s evaluation on the manufacturer\´s reputation and the latter\´s moral change in the same direction.