DocumentCode
2991963
Title
Asymmetric evolutionary game among functional logistics service providers
Author
Chun-mei Liu ; Shun-min Xun
Author_Institution
Sch. of Inf. Manage. & Eng., Shanghai Univ. of Finance & Econ., Shanghai, China
fYear
2012
fDate
20-22 Sept. 2012
Firstpage
608
Lastpage
614
Abstract
In this paper, we use the evolutionary game theory as a research tool to analyze the quality game among functional logistics service provider populations based on the logistics service supply chain and logistics service capabilities defined. As the importance of completing a logistics task cooperating is different with each other, we establish an asymmetric evolutionary game model among the functional logistics service providers. The research results show that: The game has two evolutionary stable strategies, the quality game within the functional logistics service provider populations will eventually make all providers choose the same strategy, which is, all providing high quality service products at the same time or all providing low quality service products simultaneously.
Keywords
evolutionary computation; game theory; supply chains; asymmetric evolutionary game theory; evolutionary stable strategies; functional logistic service provider population; high quality service products; logistic service capabilities; low quality service products; quality game; Games; Industries; Sociology; Statistics; Supply chains; asymmetric evolutionary game theory; evolutionary stable strategy; functional logistics service integrator;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2012 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Dallas, TX
ISSN
2155-1847
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-3015-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSE.2012.6414243
Filename
6414243
Link To Document