DocumentCode
305646
Title
A bilateral bargaining model with randomly chosen offer rights
Author
Yue, Pan ; Yingping, Zheng
Author_Institution
Inst. of Autom., Acad. Sinica, Beijing, China
Volume
1
fYear
1996
fDate
14-17 Oct 1996
Firstpage
169
Abstract
We present a model to analyze the influence of the offer right in bilateral bargainings, which is characterized by two variables, that is, the frequency to make offers and the right to make first offer. The solution concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is adopted. We also give the strategy for mediator to regulate the bargain position of players by means of choosing offer right
Keywords
economic cybernetics; game theory; bargaining position regulation; bilateral bargaining model; mediator; randomly chosen offer rights; subgame perfect equilibrium; Automation; Costs; Decision making; Engineering management; Frequency; Game theory; Power engineering and energy; Power generation economics;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1996., IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Beijing
ISSN
1062-922X
Print_ISBN
0-7803-3280-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICSMC.1996.569761
Filename
569761
Link To Document