DocumentCode
3065950
Title
Cryptoanalysis and Improvements of Cross-Realm C2C-PAKE Protocol
Author
XiaoFei, Ding ; ChuanGui, Ma
Author_Institution
Zhengzhou Inf. Sci. & Technol. Inst., Zhengzhou, China
Volume
1
fYear
2009
fDate
10-11 July 2009
Firstpage
193
Lastpage
196
Abstract
Most existing cross realm client to client password authenticated key exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocols can not resist password compromise impersonation (PCI) attack. This paper gives a method of resisting this attack and proposes an improved cross realm C2C-PAKE protocol based on EC2C-PAKA protocol [Byun et. al, 2007]. The novel protocol can hold all security characteristics of the original protocol and resist PCI attack. Then this paper proves that the improved protocol is forward secrecy under the Diffie Hellman assumption in the random oracle and ideal cipher models. Finally, through evaluating the efficiency and security of the novel protocol, the improved protocol not only has stronger security, but also is more efficient.
Keywords
computational complexity; cryptographic protocols; Diffie Hellman assumption; client to client password authenticated key exchange; cross realm C2C-PAKE protocol; cryptoanalysis; password compromise impersonation attack resistance; Authentication; Computational efficiency; Costs; Cryptography; Electronic mail; Information science; Information security; Network servers; Protocols; Resists; C2C-PAKE; PCI attack; cross-realm; forward secrecy; provable security;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Engineering, 2009. ICIE '09. WASE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Taiyuan, Shanxi
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3679-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICIE.2009.39
Filename
5210888
Link To Document