DocumentCode :
3091449
Title :
The principal-agent game analysis among accounting firm, enterprise customer and government
Author :
Jia Yuan-xiang ; Guo Hong-lian
Author_Institution :
Grad. Sch., Beijing Wuzi Univ., Beijing, China
fYear :
2013
fDate :
17-19 July 2013
Firstpage :
623
Lastpage :
627
Abstract :
The common fraud events between the public accounting firm and the audited enterprise have occurred frequently, coupled with the lack of supervision and punishment, so that the quality of accounting information is constantly seriously questioned by the public. In this paper, I establish the principal-agent model of uncertainty and without supervision between the accounting firm and enterprise by making use of principal-agent theory, analyze the model´s participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, and establish the benefit matrix between the accounting firm and government by applying the related game theory. Thus the related decision-making recommendations for the current situation are drawn.
Keywords :
accounting; game theory; government; matrix algebra; accounting firm; accounting information; benefit matrix; enterprise customer; government; incentive compatibility constraint; participation constraint; principal-agent game analysis; principal-agent uncertainty model; Analytical models; Companies; Economics; Educational institutions; Games; Government; Uncertainty; enterprise; government; principal-agent; the accounting firm;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM), 2013 10th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Hong Kong
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-4434-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICSSSM.2013.6602580
Filename :
6602580
Link To Document :
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