Title :
The study on engineering supervision incentive system based on asymmetric information
Author :
Cao, Yugui ; Wang, Huanhuan
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Manage. & Econ., North China Univ. of Water Resources & Electr. Power, Zhengzhou, China
Abstract :
The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers´ investment, special character of engineering supervisors and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervisors are put forward.
Keywords :
human resource management; incentive schemes; investment; asymmetric information; compensation performance; employer investment; engineering supervision incentive system; engineering supervisor; exogenous random variable; principal-agent model; Companies; Contracts; Economics; Integrated circuits; Investments; Random variables; Remuneration; employer; engineering supervision; incentive system; principal-agent;
Conference_Titel :
Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Deng Leng
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0535-9
DOI :
10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6010600
