DocumentCode :
3205314
Title :
A Signal Game Theory Based Reputation Model of Supply Chain of Medicine Retail Enterprises
Author :
Shumei, Yue ; Qiujun, Guo ; Weijie, Guo
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Chinese Med., Henan Univ., Kaifeng, China
Volume :
1
fYear :
2010
fDate :
11-12 May 2010
Firstpage :
343
Lastpage :
346
Abstract :
In order to improve the service offered by the medicine retail enterprises, game theory is utilized to analyze the customers’ relationships and the reputation of supply chain enterprises. Equilibrium strategies in the signaling game of catering enterprises and customers are studied theoretically. The reputation model of the supply chain enterprises is built. The reputation of supply chain influenced the judgment of customers and the profit of enterprises directly. When the cost that reduced by the establishment of reputation is greater than the maintenance cost for the catering supply chain, the game between the catering supply chain and customers will bring profit to both sides.
Keywords :
Automatic control; Automation; Costs; Ethics; Game theory; Genetic mutations; Humans; Signal analysis; Supply chains; Uncertainty; Medicine Retail Enterprises; Reputation; Signal Game Theory; Supply Chain;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Changsha, China
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7279-6
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7280-2
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICICTA.2010.351
Filename :
5523349
Link To Document :
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