A game-theoretic study of the strategic interaction between generation and transmission expansion planning

Author

Ng, Simon K K ; Zhong, Jin ; Lee, Cheuk Wing

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electr. & Electron. Eng., Univ. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

fYear

2009

fDate

15-18 March 2009

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

10

Abstract

Due to the unbundling of power generation and transmission in the restructured power system, the generation expansion planning (GEP) and transmission expansion planning (TEP) are decided by independent entities. The coordination of GEP and TEP therefore becomes a new challenge for both generation companies (GenCos) and transmission companies (TransCo). In this paper, a single-stage deterministic model is proposed to study the strategic interaction between GenCo and TransCo. Cournot model is used to simulate the expansion behaviors for both GenCo and TransCo. The equilibrium is obtained using the mixed complementarity problem approach. The proposed model is applied to a three-bus system and the IEEE 14-bus system.

Keywords

game theory; power generation planning; power transmission planning; Cournot model; IEEE 14-bus system; game-theoretic study; generation companies; generation expansion planning; mixed complementarity problem approach; single-stage deterministic model; strategic interaction; three-bus system; transmission companies; transmission expansion planning; Decision theory; Environmental economics; Game theory; Investments; Power generation; Power generation economics; Power system economics; Power system modeling; Power system planning; Strategic planning; deregulation; game theory; generation expansion planning; mixed complementarity problem; transmission expansion planning;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2009. PSCE '09. IEEE/PES

Conference_Location

Seattle, WA

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-3810-5

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-3811-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/PSCE.2009.4840024

Filename

4840024